Writing in the January-February edition of Foreign Affairs Oriana Skylar Mastro, assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University, updates some old thinking about China’s perceived attitude to it’s fractious ‘ally’ N. Korea.
There are three major misconceptions about Beijing’s position. First, China and North Korea are not ‘allies’ in any meaningful sense today. Second, China is not petrified of instability on the peninsula and an attendant refugee crisis and finally the notion that it needs a ‘buffer’ from the U.S. military stationed in the South is redundant in light of changed military capability and increased regional heft.
The relationship is so bad now, in fact the author has it from informed sources, that not only does President Xi despise the North Korean regime, and has never met Kim, but even the Chinese ambassador in Pyongyang hasn’t met Kim either.
Her sources in the PLA also tell her they are training now with a view to meeting North Korean forces in battle, not supporting them. Why would they do this? Most of the North’s nuclear capability is within 100-kilometers of the Chinese border. In the event of hostilities, reaching these before a U.S. led coalition would be vital in securing the best spot at the negotiating table that would subsequently be set up to direct the fate of a neutralized North and then unified peninsula.
She believes, in the event of missile or aerial attack, China would likely only cluck on the sidelines. Only the prospect of the U.S. putting boots on the ground [Which presently seems extremely unlikely, to me at least] would mobilize Chinese forces to seize North Korean territory; but then such a move would only be to secure their interests in a negotiated peace.
You can read the article in full via this link Why China Won’t Rescue North Korea (but you’ll need a subscription or to sign up to their one-free-article-a-month deal to get full access).
Happy Sunday.